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ABSTRACT
Eye-gaze and mid-air gestures are promising for resisting various
types of side-channel attacks during authentication. However, to
date, a comparison of the different authentication modalities is
missing. We investigate multiple authentication mechanisms that
leverage gestures, eye gaze, and a multimodal combination of them
and study their resilience to shoulder surfing. To this end, we report
on our implementation of three schemes and results from usability
and security evaluations where we also experimented with fixed
and randomized layouts. We found that the gaze-based approach
outperforms the other schemes in terms of input time, error rate,
perceived workload, and resistance to observation attacks, and that
randomizing the layout does not improve observation resistance
enough to warrant the reduced usability. Our work further under-
lines the significance of replicating previous eye tracking studies
using today’s sensors as we show significant improvement over
similar previously introduced gaze-based authentication systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy; •Human-centered computing→Hu-
man computer interaction (HCI);
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1 INTRODUCTION
With computers enabling ubiquitous access to private data, numer-
ous authentication schemes have been proposed and adopted by
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Figure 1: The figure shows a participant (1) authenticating
using gaze by dwelling at 2 for 500 ms, (2) authenticating us-
ing gestures by extending 9 fingers, (3) authenticating using
GazeGestures+Randomwhere the user first gazes at the digit
4, which is displayed on a randomized layout, and then ex-
tends 2 right hand fingers resulting in an input of 4 + 2 = 6,
(4) authenticating using GazeGestures by gazing at 6, which
is displayed on a fixed layout, and then extends 4 left hand
fingers resulting in an input of 6 − 4 = 2.
users. Privacy-aware users employ graphical passwords, alphanu-
meric passwords, and PINs to protect access to their computers, on-
line accounts, and sensitive files. However, many of these schemes
are vulnerable to different types of side-channel attacks. For ex-
ample, alphanumeric and graphical passwords are known to be
vulnerable to shoulder surfing and video attacks [16, 29, 33]. A
study conducted by the Ponemon Institute investigated shoulder
surfing attacks in business office environments and found that 12%
of observed content was login credentials (e.g., passwords) and that
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91% of attacks were successful [20]. Other forms of side-channel
attacks include thermal and smudge attacks, which can reveal pass-
words entered on keyboards and touchscreens [1, 5, 27].
Many smartphones come with a fingerprint reader integrated,
and advances in depth cameras promise seamless integration of fa-
cial recognition in commodity devices (e.g., iPhone X). In addition to
physiological biometrics, another promising area is behavioral bio-
metrics [10, 11], in which behavior is used to identify the legitimate
user. However, while biometric authentication schemes are not
vulnerable to the aforementioned side-channel attacks, they come
with different problems as they cannot be changed once leaked.
Furthermore, they often result in third-parties learning about the
user’s biometric data, which can, in turn, be misused or stolen
remotely [32, 39]. Therefore, designing secure knowledge-based
schemes, i.e., schemes that require the legitimate user to know some-
thing such as a password, which resists these types of attacks is
essential to fit different user preferences, tasks, and contexts.
At the same time, sensors such as eye trackers and motion sen-
sors are increasingly becoming more accurate, affordable, and are
already integrated into some consumer devices today. Previous
work has shown that employing gaze [15, 24] and gestures [4, 18]
can significantly improve authentication schemes in terms of ob-
servation resistance. Furthermore, the combination of multiple
modalities can significantly complicate shoulder surfing attacks
[8, 23] An additional advantage of at-a-distance interaction modali-
ties, such as gaze or gestures, is that they allow designing schemes
that split the shoulder surfer’s attention to (1) the user’s input, and
(2) the screen. For example, to shoulder surf a user’s gaze input in
response to on-screen cues, the attacker would have to observe the
user’s eye movements, in addition to the on-screen cues [24].
While recent work compared multiple modalities for cue-based
authentication [25], a comparison of multimodal authentication
approaches is missing. To close this gap, we report on 6 concepts:
(1) Gaze+Random: Gaze-based Authentication with a random-
ized arrangement of on-screen digits.
(2) Gaze-only:Gaze-based Authentication with a fixed arrange-
ment of on-screen digits.
(3) Gestures-only: Hand Gestures-based Authentication.
(4) GazeGestures+Random:Multimodal authentication using
hand gestures and gaze with a randomized on-screen digits.
(5) GazeGestures:Multimodal authentication using hand ges-
tures and gaze with a fixed arrangement of on-screen digits.
(6) Baseline: Traditional keyboard-based authentication.
In our gaze-based systems, users dwell at a digit on an on-screen
number pad for 500 ms to select it. While in Gestures-only, the
number of fingers the user extends denote the input. Finally, in the
multimodal approaches, users authenticate by gazing at a digit on
an on-screen number pad, then perform a hand-gesture to indicate
an addition or subtraction operation to be applied on the gazed at
digit. For example, to enter 5 the user could gaze at 2 and extend 3
right-hand fingers, or gaze at 6 and extend 1 left-hand finger. The
multimodal approach was introduced to enhance the security in
the Gestures-only modality.
While multimodal approaches are often superior to unimodal
ones [7, 21], we found that the gaze-based approach outperforms
the other schemes in terms of input time, error rate, perceived
workload and resistance to shoulder surfing attacks. Multimodal
GazeGestures were found to be highly resilient to shoulder surf-
ing, but suffer from lower usability, hence we recommend them
only when additional security is needed rather than for daily use.
Although our gaze-based approach is a replication of a previous sys-
tem proposed in 2007 [26], our study results indicate a significant
(70%) improvement over prior work in authentication time mainly
due to the use of better sensors and improved visual computing
techniques. This motivates the replication of previous work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Traditional PINs and alphanumeric passwords are among of the
most commonly used authentication methods [36], yet they are
vulnerable to several types of side channel attacks. A widely studied
side channel attack is shoulder surfing, where a malicious attacker
attempts to observe the user during authentication, in order to
later gain access to the user’s device [16]. Previous work also ex-
plored smudge attacks against touchscreens. In a smudge attack,
the attacker examines the device’s touchscreen and tries to find
the entered PIN or graphical password based on the oily residues
left after entering the password [5]. Traditional password input
methods are also vulnerable to thermal attacks, in which an at-
tacker employs a thermal camera to detect the heat traces resulting
from the user’s interaction with the device to eventually infer the
password [1, 27].
A challenge in this field is to design methods that are easy to
use, efficient and effective from a usability perspective, while at the
same time maintaining high security. Prior work proposed a variety
of, mostly individual, interaction techniques to protect against the
aforementioned attacks. In our work, we compare and evaluate
the usability and security of multiple unimodal and multimodal
authentication schemes. In the following, we discuss prior work
that investigated similar authentication modalities.
2.1 Authentication using Gaze
Humans move their eyes quickly. Additionally, while eye move-
ments are overt, the resolution of gaze interfaces can be designed
to encourage covert eye movements that are challenging to observe.
This inspired researchers to leverage eye gaze for authentication.
One of the leading efforts in eye-Gaze authentication was pro-
posed by De Luca et al. who introduced and compared several
gaze-based authentication schemes [14], one of which was referred
to as EyePIN in a follow-up project [9]. Users authenticate using
EyePIN by gazing at digits on an on-screen number pad; selection
occurs after a dwell time of 800 ms. Later, De Luca et al. introduced
EyePassShapes, which relies on a series of gaze gestures [9]. Eye-
PassShapes required more time (12.5 seconds) but was assumed to
be more secure since it is more difficult to observe multiple con-
secutive gaze gestures. Kumar et al. proposed EyePassword, an
authentication scheme that combines gaze with keyboard input;
users gaze at a digit on an on-screen keyboard and then select it
either by dwell time or by pressing the space bar on their physi-
cal keyboard [26]. CGP is a cued-recall graphical password with
a larger password space, where users can recall several distinct
passwords [17]; its users authenticate by looking at certain posi-
tions on a given picture. Finally, several works proposed gaze-based
behavioral biometric authentication [30, 31].
Just Gaze and Wave ETRA ’19, June 25–28, 2019, Denver , CO, USA
2.2 Authentication using Gestures
Similar to gaze, mid-air gestures were investigated for knowledge-
based authentication (i.e., by providing a password) and for bio-
metric authentication. George et al. evaluated a mid-air version of
Android patterns for immersive virtual environments, where a user
wears a Head-mounted Display and draws a pattern on a virtual
3×3 grid using a handheld controller [18]. Hayashi et al. proposed
biometric authentication using gestural patterns and body segments
[19]. Aslan et al. exploited individual differences among users in
performing mid-air gestures for biometric authentication [3].
2.3 Multimodal Authentication
Researchers have studied how to utilize multiple modalities to com-
bat shoulder surfing. Bianchi et al. proposedmultiple authentication
schemes: SpinLock, ColorLock and Phone Lock, in which PIN entry
on mobile devices is guided by haptic or audio cues [6–8]. Here,
users hear audio cues or perceive vibrations, and accordingly, they
modify their input. Although their security was not formally eval-
uated, they are expected to be more secure than traditional PIN
entry since attackers would have to observe the cue, and the user’s
input in response to the cue to eavesdrop the password.
In these works, the additional modality was an output modality
(haptic or audio) to support users in providing PINs using an input
modality (touch). On the other hand, a body of work explored using
multiple input modalities; GazeTouchPass and GazeTouchPIN allow
users to authenticate on mobile devices using touch input and gaze
input [21, 24], while GTmoPass is an adaptation of GazeTouchPass
for public display scenarios [23]. In GazeTouchPass, users authen-
ticate by providing a multimodal password consisting of digits
entered via touch and gaze gestures detected by the front-facing
camera of the mobile device (e.g., touch(1), gaze(left), touch(2),
gaze(right)). While in GazeTouchPIN, users first tap a pair of digits,
and then gaze left or right to specify which digit they want to en-
ter. The layout of the shown digits is randomly determined based
on one of two predefined layouts. This means that observing the
gaze input in an occasion, and the touch input in another occasion,
and then combining the observations is very unlikely to reveal the
password. Overall, these systems demonstrated higher resistance
to shoulder surfing at the expense of longer authentication times.
For example, combining gaze and touch input made authentication
highly secure against observations, but mean authentication times
were 3.1 seconds [21], and 10.8 seconds [24].
We employ a similar implementation of EyePIN [9], with a
slightly shorter dwell duration (500 ms instead of 800 ms). How-
ever, in our study, participants authenticated in 5.3 s, while EyePIN
users authenticated in 13 s. For gestures, we explore authentication
by extending a number of fingers, which was not studied before. Fi-
nally, we explore multimodal authentication using mid-air gestures
and gaze, which were never employed for authentication before.
We previously presented our concepts as a poster [2]; we signifi-
cantly extend this by in-depth evaluation and discussion of their
implementation, usability and security.
3 CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the concepts that we explored for au-
thentication, as well as their implementation.
3.1 Gaze-based Authentication
Gaze is subtle yet intuitive, making it a promising modality to
employ when susceptible to shoulder surfing. As we discussed in
section 2.1, gaze has been leveraged for authentication before.
In our system implementation, we use a similar layout to that
of EyePIN [14]. The difference is our users authenticate using our
system by fixating their eyes on the desired digit for 500 ms. For
example, to select 2 in Figure 1.1, the user should dwell on the digit
for 500 ms. The dwell time was decided based on a pilot test where
we compared three dwell times from prior work in eye tracking
[9, 17], and had participants try them and provide feedback. 500ms
was deemed natural and induced few errors.
In our implementation, calibration is essential at the beginning.
However, advances in visual computing promise either a signifi-
cant reduction of calibration time [28] or a complete elimination
of calibration by, for example, appearance-based gaze estimation
methods [38]. Hence we expect that future systems would require
marginal time for calibration.
In Gaze-only, we show the user a classical 10-digit number
pad. However, in Gaze+Random, the order of digits is random-
ized. Adding randomness results in higher observation-resistance,
because it would require the attacker to observe both: (1) the user’s
gaze input, and (2) the layout to which the user is reacting. On
the downside, a random arrangement of digits would likely result
in longer entry times since users would need to perform a linear
search to find the desired digit. It could also increase the error rate.
Whenever inputwas detected, the systemmade a “button clicked”
sound to indicate that an entry has been recognized. A password
field was updated at each entry. The password field was designed
to be large enough for users to notice that it has been updated in
their periphery. These two features, as well as the dimensions of the
layout, were determined based on a pilot test with 3 participants.
3.2 Gesture-based Authentication
While it might be obvious to observers, signaling digits via hand
fingers is likely to be highly intuitive. It also could be less secure,
that’s why we added the multimodal approach discussed in sub-
section 3.3 to be able to compare the modalities at the end and to
enhance the gesture-based security.
In our implementation of Gestures-only, the user performs a
hand gesture to signal the desired digit in the area above a leap
motion sensor, which we use for gesture recognition. The sensor
counts the number of fingers extended for one second to determine
the intended digit. This threshold was essential to prevent uninten-
tionally inputting zero when changing from one digit to another.
Users can use either hands or both of them to indicate the digit.
Figure 1.2, shows an example of a user entering digit 9 by both
of her hands. In case of input via gestures, the interface shows an
additional entry in the password field.
3.3 Multimodal Gaze and Gestures
The multimodal approach combines both, the user’s gaze and the
performed gestures in one authentication method. This method
was introduced as a way to make the Gestures-only authentication
more secure. First, the user gazes at an on-screen digit and then
performs a mid-air gesture by extending a number of fingers above
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the Leap Motion. Using right-hand fingers results in adding the
gesture-based input to the gaze-based input, while the left-hand
fingers result in a subtraction.
Figures 1.3 left and 1.3 right, show an example where the user
gazed at the digit 4 and extended 2 right-hand fingers, hence the
entered digits are 4 + 2 = 6. On the other hand, Figures 1.4 left and
1.4 right, show an example of a user gazing at 6 and extending
4 left-hand fingers, so the entered digit is 6 - 4 = 2. The system
awaited input using both modalities. This means that gazing at the
correct digit would only activate it if the leap motion can detect
a hand without any fingers extended. This method is complicated
than the previous ones as it needs basic math calculation in each
digit entry, which will put an extra delay on the authentication
time; however, it is expected to be more secure.
We refer to this system as GazeGestures. Similar to gaze-based
authentication (Section 3.1), we implemented a version of GazeGes-
tures with a randomized on-screen arrangement of digits, and a
version with a fixed layout.
4 USABILITY STUDY EVALUATION
The goal of this study was to collect a realistic set of login attempts
to analyze usability, as well as video recordings to be used in the
security evaluation.
4.1 Experimental Design
The study was designed as a within-subjects repeated measures ex-
periment; i.e., all participants went through all conditions. The study
involved one independent variable: the authentication method. Our
experiment covered six conditions: (1) Gaze-only with Random
Layout, (2) Gaze-only with Fixed Layout, (3) Gestures-only, (4)
GazeGestures with random layout, (5) GazeGestures with fixed lay-
out, and (6) PIN (baseline).
4.2 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses
We measured the effect of the six authentication methods on:
• Entry time: starting from the moment the password is told
to the user, until the moment the password is recognized by
the system.
• Error rate: the number of times the password was entered
incorrectly before successfully authenticating. An entry was
considered to be an error if one or more of the password’s
symbols were incorrect.
• Perceived workload: through the NASA-TLX questionnaire.
• Subjective feedback: collected through a questionnaire and
a semi-structured interview.
The following are the null hypotheses:
H0,0 There is no statistically significant relationship between the
authentication method and entry time.
H0,1 There is no statistically significant relationship between the
authentication method and error rate.
4.3 Apparatus and Participants
To detect the gestures, we used a LeapMotionModel lm-c011. It was
placed on the right-hand side for right-handed participants, and on
1https://www.leapmotion.com/
Figure 2: The Usability study setup consisted of 1) a Leap
Motion to detect extended fingers, 2) Tobii eye tracker for
gaze input, 3) a web cam and an HD camera to record the
user while authenticating for follow up security analysis.
the left-hand side for left-handed participants. We made sure it does
not result in the user’s hand obstructing the eye tracker’s view. The
recognition range of the used Leap Motion is between 82.5 mm and
317.5 mm. Gaze input was detected using a Tobii 4C eye tracker
(60Hz) 2. The eye tracker was attached to a monitor (17”, 1366 × 768
pixels). The sensors were set up as illustrated in Figure 2. We built
a CSharp interface in Visual Studio 2012 with the use of the Tobii
and Leap Motion SDKs. Participants were free to enter the baseline
PINs using the keyboard or the mouse. Participants sat 80 cm away
from the display. We video recorded participants during the study
using an HD video camera from the back, that shows the gesture
input and screen layout, and a webcam from the front, that shows
the user’s gaze input. The cameras were positioned in a way to
simulate an attacker that is observing the user.
We invited 17 participants aged between 21 and 28 (Mean=24.41;
SD=1.87), four of them wear glasses. Ten of which were males
and seven were females. Participants came from a variety of back-
grounds including students and teaching assistants from engineer-
ing, computer science, business informatics majors.
4.4 Experiment Procedure
After arriving at our lab, participants filled-in a consent form. The
experimenter then explained the study and collected the partic-
ipant’s demographics. After that, the eye tracker was calibrated
for the participants using Tobii’s software. Each participant then
went through 6 blocks, each block covered one condition. The order
of blocks was counterbalanced using a Latin Square. Blocks that
involved GazeGestures and GazeGestures+Random were divided
into 5 stages, the rest were divided into 4 stages. In Stage 1, par-
ticipants performed 2 training runs using the respective condition
to get acquainted with the authentication method. In Stage 2, par-
ticipants performed 5 authentications using the current block’s
authentication method. We limited Stage 2âĂŹs authentications to
5 to reduce the likelihood of eye fatigue and maintain a reasonable
experiment duration; in real authentication scenarios, users would
not authenticate as often as they did in our study. The required
2https://tobiigaming.com/eye-tracker-4c/
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passwords were different in each stage and were read out loud by
the experimenter according to a random predefined list. After each
successful login, an “access granted” message was shown, and then
the participant was asked to proceed enter the following password.
If the wrong password is detected an error message was shown
instead, and the user had to reattempt entry until successful.
For realism and to measure the error rate, participants were able
to reenter incorrectly detected passwords. In the case of GazeGes-
tures, the participant was free to choose the digits to gaze at and
the gestures to perform in order to enter the intended password.
For example, to enter 5, a participant could gaze at the digit 3 and
add 2 using a right-hand gesture, or gaze at 9 and subtract 4 using a
left-hand gesture. These entries were then analyzed to evaluate the
usability of the method. To understand the participants’ PIN choices
using our methods, the participant was asked to choose his/her
own PIN in Stage 3. The participant entered the chosen PIN two
consecutive times as done on typical authentication systems: users
need to confirm the password they have created to aid memorability
and overcome entry errors. For instance, would users gaze at the
same digit and perform the same gesture when using GazeGestures,
or would they provide the digit in different ways every time? In both
conditions that involve GazeGestures, participants went through an
additional stage. In Stage 4, participants entered the same password
they defined in the previous stage, but this time with the system
telling the user which hand to use for performing the gestures.
This was done to understand how users feel about restrictions (e.g.,
password policies) intended to strengthen their password entry. In
the final stage, participants filled in a questionnaire in which we
asked for their subjective feedback regarding the block’s method,
and they filled in a NASA TLX questionnaire.
4.5 Limitations
One limitation of the usability study is that three participants re-
ported experiencing eye fatigue after authenticating via eye gaze
several times. This happened in cases where Gaze-only and Gaze +
Random blocks came directly after each other. Note, however, that
users authenticated multiple consecutive times for our experimen-
tation purposes, and that in realistic scenarios, they are likely to
authenticate significantly fewer times.
4.6 Usability Experiment Results
Prior to analyzing the entry time and error rate, we excluded the
data from 2 out of 17 participants due to technical problems.
4.6.1 Entry time. The authentication in time in seconds can be
seen in figure 3. In addition, a repeated measures ANOVA with
Greenhouse-Geisser correction revealed a significant main effect
of the authentication method on entry time F1.5,20.93 = 26.2,
p < 0.001; thereby disproving null hypothesis H0,0. Pairwise com-
parisons with Bonferroni correction showed significant differences
between multiple pairs (see Table 1).
The results show that authenticating using the baseline is signif-
icantly faster than all other methods. Gaze-only and Gaze+Random
come second, being significantly faster to authenticate with com-
pared to the remaining methods. Gaze-only is slightly faster than
Gaze+Random, however, the difference is not significant (p >
0.05). Gestures-only is significantly faster than GazeGestures and
Figure 3: Authentication time in seconds. The gaze methods
are faster to use compared to Gestures and GazeGestures.
Figure 4: The number of attempts before a successful
entry. Baseline and Gaze-only are the least error-prone.
Gaze+Random is slightly more error-prone.
GazeGestures+Random. Finally, the difference between GazeGes-
tures and GazeGestures+Random is not significant (p > 0.05).
4.6.2 Error Rate. A repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction revealed a significant main effect of the authen-
tication method on error rate F1.97,27.53 = 4.9, p < 0.05; thereby
disproving null hypothesis H0,1. Pairwise comparisons with Bonfer-
roni correction revealed significant differences between some pairs.
Namely, the Baseline (M = 0.08, SD = 0.04) is significantly less
error-prone compared to GazeGestures (M = 1.16, SD = 0.23)
and GazeGestures+Random (M = 1.69, SD = 0.27). Similarly,
Gaze-only (M = 0.25, SD = 0.17) is significantly less error-prone
compared to GazeGestures and GazeGestures+Random. Figure 4
illustrates the number of attempts before a successful entry.
4.6.3 Perceived Workload. Figure 5 illustrates the responses to the
NASA TLX. In general, Baseline, Gaze-only, and Gaze+Random
were the least demanding. Gestures were found to be the most
physically demanding. In general, methods that involved gestures
(Gestures-only, GazeGestures, and GazeGestures+Random) were
perceived to be more demanding.
4.6.4 Learning Effects. We also found that users authenticate faster
as they enter more PINs, which suggests that there is a learning ef-
fect and that performance would eventually improve after repeated
usage, i.e., GazeGestures+Random average results dropped from 56
seconds in the first attempt to 18 seconds in the last one.
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Entry Time
Significantly different Methods p < Significantly different Methods p <
Gaze+Random (6.28 s) Gestures-only (12.41 s) 0.001 Gestures-only (12.41 s) GazeGestures+Random (20.63 s) 0.001
Gaze+Random (6.28 s) GazeGestures+Random (20.63 s) 0.05 Gestures-only (12.41 s) GazeGestures (19.43 s) 0.05
Gaze+Random (6.28 s) GazeGestures (19.43 s) 0.001 Baseline (2.15 s) Gaze+Random (6.28 s) 0.05
Gaze-only (5.31 s) Gestures-only (12.41 s) 0.001 Baseline (2.15 s) Gaze-only (5.31 s) 0.05
Gaze-only (5.31 s) GazeGestures+Random (20.63 s) 0.01 Baseline (2.15 s) Gestures-only (12.41 s) 0.05
Gaze-only (5.31 s) GazeGestures (19.43 s) 0.001 Baseline (2.15 s) GazeGestures (19.43 s) 0.05
Baseline (2.15 s) GazeGestures+Random (20.63 s) 0.05
Table 1: The baseline is significantly faster compared to the other methods. Gaze-only and Gaze+Random are significantly
faster than all others except, Gaze+Randomwhich is slightly slower than Gaze-only. Gestures-only is significantly faster than
GazeGestures and GazeGestures+Random, while GazeGestures+Random is slightly slower than GazeGestures.
Figure 5: The mean Task Load index score of participants as
indicated in the NASA TLX questionnaire.
4.6.5 Subjective Feedback. We collected subjective feedback through
5-point likert scale questions (see Figure 6), and held semi-structured
interviews at the end of the study. Participants found Gaze-only
and Gaze+Random particularly easy, fast, pleasant and fun com-
pared to Gestures-only, GazeGestures, and GazeGestures+Random.
They also indicated that they are more likely to use Gaze-only
and Gaze+Random for their daily authentications. However, Gaze-
only, GazeGestures and their variants were perceived to be more
secure and likely to use to protect sensitive data. Participants rated
Gestures-only negatively on almost all aspects. Participants rated
Gaze-only and Gaze+Random as fun, easy andmore secure than the
Baseline. They found GazeGestures and GazeGestures+Random
difficult to use but more secure. .
5 SECURITY STUDY EVALUATION
Since GazeGestures, Gaze-only and, Gestures-only are secure against
smudge attacks and thermal attacks by design, we focused on evalu-
ating and comparing the schemes in terms of observation resistance.
5.1 Apparatus and Participants
A 14” display (1366 × 768 pixels) was used in our experiments.
We invited 16 participants (9 female), aged between 24 and 30
(Mean=24.68; SD=2.33), through word of mouth.
5.2 Experiment Procedure
Using the videos recorded in the usability study, each security study
participant (attacker) performed two types of attacks: (1) Single-
observation attack: the participant watched the video once and
made up to three guesses against the password. This was done to
Figure 6: Qualitative feedback on the six methods on a 5-
point Likert Scale (1 = StronglyDisagree; 5 = StronglyAgree).
simulate a case of casual observation, and (2) Video-observation
attack: the participant had full control over the video and could
pause and rewind asmuch as he/she likes. This was done to simulate
a worst case scenario, where an attacker could record the user.
Each participant performed 12 single-observation attacks and 12
video-observation attacks. Note that we did not use all the videos
that were recorded in the usability study. Instead, we used a random
subset from the recordings such that a) each attacker observed
an equal number of passwords entered using each input method
through single-observations and two video-observations, and b)
no attacker saw the same password more than once. After each
attack, the participant could provide up to 3 guesses. Participants
were provided with a pen and draft papers to take notes while
performing the attacks.
Participants were not told if their guesses were correct before the
end of the study to avoid biasing the reported perceived difficulty
of observations. Participants were asked to put as much effort as
possible and try their best to really find the entered passwords. The
experiment took approximately 45 minutes.
After performing all attacks, the participants were asked to fill in
a questionnaire (4 questions) in which they indicated on a 5-point
Likert scale how easy it is to attack passwords and how confident
they are about their answers for each password and attack type.
5.3 Experimental Design
Our study was conducted as a repeated measure experiment, where
we had two independent variables: (1) the authentication method
used in the previous study, and (2) the attack type: participants per-
formed single observation attacks and video-observation attacks.
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Figure 7: The lower the distance between the guess and the
original PIN, the stronger the guess is.
5.4 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses
To evaluate the observation resistance, we measured the Leven-
shtein distance between the guesses and the correct password to
analyze how close the guess is to the correct password. The Leven-
shtein distance refers to the distance between the attackers’ guesses
and the correct password; it is a commonly used metric in security
analysis that reveals how close a guess is to the original password
[13, 21, 25]. Thus, Levenshtein distance was the dependent variable.
The null hypothesis is:
H1,0 There is no statistically significant relationship between the
authentication method and Levenshtein distance.
5.5 Security Experiment Results
5.5.1 Levenshtein Distance. The mean Levenshtein distance per
condition and per attack are illustrated in Figure 7. A repeated
measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction revealed a
significant main effect of authentication method on Levenshtein
distance F2.75,38.5 = 137.38, p < 0.001; thereby disproving null
hypothesis H1,1. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
showed significant differences between baseline (M = 1.08, SD =
0.16) and all other conditions (p < 0.001), and between Gestures-
only(M = 0.07, SD = 0.03) and all other conditions (p < 0.001).
This means that guesses against PINs entered using Gestures-
only are significantly closer to the correct PIN compared to guesses
against PINs entered using the other methods (including the base-
line). The second shortest distances to the original PINs were in
case of guesses against Baseline, which were closer to the correct
PIN compared to all other methods except Gestures-only. The lack
of significant differences between the other methods means that
we did not find any evidence that guesses against one of them are
more successful than others.
5.5.2 Subjective Feedback. Figure 8, shows the collected subjective
feedback from the participants. Attackers perceived Gestures-only
to be easy to attack and were confident about their guesses in
both attack types. This is comparable to the Baseline, where it
has the second highest score in terms of easiness of attacks and
the attackers’ confidence. Gaze+Random is as easy to attack as
GazeGestures, and attackers rated their confidence similarly too.
Figure 8: Participants rated their confidence in their attacks
and their easiness on a Likert Scales (1 = Strongly Disagree;
5 = Strongly Agree).
The 2 methods are perceived to be more difficult than Gestures-only
and Baseline. 7 participants rated Gaze-only as more difficult to
attack compared to Gaze+Random and GazeGestures, and indicated
that they are less confident about their guesses against them.
6 DISCUSSION
The results of the different evaluations allowed us to investigate
the the usability and security of the authentication schemes.
6.1 Usability vs Security
Several works observed a trade-off between usability and security
[12, 35]. Similarly, we also found such a trade-off. Although the
usability of the GazeGestures (19.43s) and GazeGestures+Random
(20.63s) are the lowest compared to all modalities, they offer higher
security than the Baseline and Gestures-only. On the other hand,
while Gestures-only (12.41s) has an adequate authentication time,
it is error-prone and it is perceived to be the least secure.
In contrast, the Gaze-only and Gaze+Random achieve a balance
between usability and security, where they have an adequate au-
thentication time, the least error rate, and the least mental, physical,
temporal, effort and frustration rates compared to GazeGestures,
GazeGestures+Random, and Gestures-only. Gaze-only (5.31s) and
Gaze+Random (6.28s) have the highest performance. They are also
perceived to be the most secure against both attack types.
6.2 Iterative Attacks
Previous work evaluated multimodal authentication against iter-
ative attacks, where the shoulder surfer attacks one modality per
observation and then combines observations [21]. In our work, we
evaluated the security schemes in a worst case scenario in which the
attacker has access to a synchronized view of all necessary entities:
the user’s hand gestures, the user’s eyes, and the on-screen number
pad. In the usability study, we gathered information about the way
users entered each PIN. For example, in the case of GazeGestures
and GazeGestures+Random; we checked the combinations between
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the digit entered by the gaze and the one entered by the hand, and
whether the user uses the same combination every time they enter
that digit (Stage 3 in the usability study). We found that most of the
users (88%) use different combinations every time, and very few
(12%) had their own pattern which they repeat.
This suggests that users would often enter the same PIN in dif-
ferent ways, which in turn means that performing iterative attacks
is very less likely to succeed because the user might be performing
different inputs by each modality each time. One example for this,
a user could enter a 5 by gazing at 3 and extending 2 right-hand
fingers, or by gazing at 4 and extending 1 right-hand finger.
6.3 Dominant and Non-Dominant Hands
We also found that participants tended to use a specific hand (mostly
their dominant hand) in all cases unless they were asked to change
it. However, they were annoyed by being forced to use a specific
hand which was done in stage 4 for the GazeGestures and the
GazeGestures+Random cases. In case of using the non-dominant
hand, the authentication time was higher and more error-prone.
Also, left-handed participants did not like that their left hand sig-
naled subtractions. Thus in future systems should accommodate
this. One way to accommodate this is to allow users to customize
the use of each hand – this could also improve observation resis-
tance as the attacker would need to know which configuration is
being used.
For the Gestures-only modality, using both hands was very diffi-
cult for the participants as it required high physical and temporal
demand, and that appeared in the TLX score (Figure 5). This led to a
high score for Gestures-only in the frustration and effort level. The
suggestion here is to use only one hand, however, this will reduce
the number of possible combinations.
6.4 Effect of Randomized Layout
In contrast to our work, several previous works found a significant
impact of randomized layout on security. For instance, users au-
thenticated using GazeTouchPIN using gaze gestures in response
to a randomized on-screen cue [24]. Similarly, in SwiPIN [34], ran-
dom visual cues were shown on the digits to which users should
swipe via touch accordingly. However, in our implementation we
employed gaze dwell time, which is already more difficult to ob-
serve compared to gaze gestures and touch swipes. For this reason,
the impact of the randomized layout is not apparent in our im-
plementation. However, similar to previous work, the randomized
layouts have a negative impact on usability. Therefore, since it neg-
atively impacts usability and has a minor impact on security, we
recommend refraining from using randomized layouts when using
modalities that feature a high input entropy, such as gaze.
6.5 Guessing by Elimination
A disadvantage of GazeGestures is that attackers were able to some-
times guess PINs if the addition or the subtraction operations would
otherwise result in a digit more than 9 or less than 0. For example,
if a user gazes at 3 and extends 4 fingers but the attacker did not
recognize which hand was used, the attacker could guess that the
used hand was the right one since subtracting 4 from 3 would result
in a number less than 0. This is a limitation in GazeGestures that
ideally, users would keep in mind when using the technique.
6.6 Final Recommendations
To conclude, our results indicate that gaze-based authentication
outperforms the other methods in terms of usability and security.
We also argue that the random layout is not necessary; it increases
authentication time but does not have a strong impact on security.
Although a similar method was proposed in previous work [14], our
implementation requires 5.3 second to authenticate, while previous
work required 13 seconds.
Furthermore, the security evaluation shows that the method
is highly resilient to shoulder surfing, while thermal and smudge
attacks are unfeasible against gaze-based authentication by design.
The fact that our implementation is not very different, yet the
results are more positive than in the past, suggests that there is a
need to revisit authentication schemes that were introduced in the
past. Many introduced schemes were dismissed in practice due to
requiring significantly longer entry times or due to high error rates.
Nevertheless, our work demonstrates that the recent advances in
visual computing offer more accurate sensors that can allow faster
authentication times and lower error rates, while at the same time
maintaining high resilience to shoulder surfing.
Gestures suffer from low usability and low observation resistance.
Hence we do not recommend them for authentication.
Finally, GazeGestures demonstrate high security, albeit long
authentication times and relatively high error rates. While observa-
tion resistance of Gaze-only was higher than that of GazeGestures,
note that to attack GazeGestures the observer needs to simultane-
ously observe two views: the user’s eyes, and the user’s fingers.
This means that in practice, attacking GazeGestures is more dif-
ficult. Furthermore, we believe that the continuously improving
performance of eye trackers and motion sensors, and the observed
learning effect promise better usability results in the future. Hence
while GazeGesturesis not suitable for regular daily use, it can be
suitable for highly sensitive contexts (e.g., when sensitive data is
being accessed or when surrounded by shoulder surfers).
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we introduced and evaluated 6 authentication schemes
that employ gaze, gestures and multimodal combinations of them.
We found that gaze offers a good balance between usability and
security; it is highly secure against shoulder surfing yet requires
shorter authentication times, and is less error-prone. Random on-
screen layouts were found to negatively influence usability without
a strong effect on security. Multimodal gaze and gestures show
promise however with current technologies they are slow and error-
prone, and in optimal conditions, it is worse in terms of observation
resistance compared to gaze.
Future work should investigate different ways of integrating the
proposed methods with biometric authentication. We also intend
to investigate further threat models, such as insider attacks [37]
and attacks from multiple observers [22].
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